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J. Emmerling, M. Tavoni
1 Introduction15
The slow progress in climate change abatement policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas16
emissions has fueled the discussion about alternative policy options in order to cope with the17
impacts from climate change. Among these, climate engineering refers to the deliberate and18
large-scale intervention in the earth’s climatic system with the aim of reducing global warm-19
ing. Climate engineering options which counteract the temperature increase by managing20
incoming solar radiation (solar radiation management or SRM) have become increasingly21
debated in recent years.1 Climate engineering has been argued to be a more cost-effective22
solution since it can reduce the effects of global warming relatively fast (Shepherd et al.23
2009; Matthews and Caldeira 2007) and hence provides a potential game-changing option24
for climate policies (Swart and Marinova 2010; Victor et al. 2009). This has fueled a lively25
policy and scientiﬁc debate which is likely to further intensify in the coming years. Several26
institutions (US Congress, NASA, the Royal Society, National Academy of Sciences, the27
IPCC, and the UK Parliament) have started assessing and debating the potential of climate28
engineering. Fundamental opposed opinions are presented in this debate, often attributable29
to the fundamental uncertainties characterizing climate engineering approaches.30
Historically, the reduction in solar radiation after volcanic eruptions has provided natu-31
ral “experiments” as a basis for climate engineering via solar radiation management. For32
instance, in 1991, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo injected around 20 megatons of sulfur33
dioxide into the stratosphere, which led global temperatures to decrease by about 0.5 ◦C in34
the years following the eruption (Soden et al. 2002; Crutzen 2006). This illustrates the poten-35
tial of quickly reducing global temperature through the periodic and continued injection of36
sulfate particles into the stratosphere. The extent to which this can compensate the radiative37
forcing of greenhouse gases and the associated climate damages is highly debated. The most38
recent literature suggests that while climate engineering cannot fully reverse climate change39
around the globe (Ricke et al. 2010), it still has the potential to partly compensate tempera-40
ture and precipitation patterns even regionally (although not simultaneously) (Moreno-Cruz41
et al. 2012; Caldeira and Wood 2008). On the other hand, SRM technologies brings about42
substantial risks and potential side-effects such as ozone depletion, side effects of the imple-43
mentation itself (Robock et al. 2009; Tilmes et al. 2008), as well as region-speciﬁc impacts44
such as increased droughts (Haywood et al. 2013). Moreover, SRM does not reduce the45
amount of carbon in the atmosphere. Therefore, damages from increased CO2 concentration46
such as ocean acidiﬁcation are notmitigated, and,moreover, a climate engineering policy can-47
not be suddenly discontinued as an abrupt temperature change would likely occur (Brovkin48
et al. 2008; Irvine et al. 2012). These and other potential side-effects of climate engineering49
are important to take into consideration, see Robock (2008) and Klepper and Rickels (2014)50
for a recent overview.51
One common feature of most climate engineering options is that it tends to be speculative.52
First of all, no (large-scale) experiments have been conducted in order to assess its full53
potential to counteract global warming.2 Second, the implementation is challenging in many54
respects. Even if climate engineering measures were effective in mitigating climate change55
1 The broader term geoengineering i fact encompasses all engineering approaches to alter geophysical
processes. While this term has been used extensively in recent years, “climate engineering” has been proposed
to refer to methods altering the climate per se, notably the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and
Solar Radiation Management (SRM). Throughout this article, we use the term climate engineering referring
to SRM measures, as they have been frequently used interchangeably in the literature.
2 The recent simulations in MacMartin et al. (2014) suggest that possibly even smaller scale implementations
and experiments might be feasible, but on a theoretical level.
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Climate Engineering and Abatement: A ‘ﬂat’ Relationship…
and were technically feasible to implement, very little is known about the size and scale of56
potential side effects discussed above. Still, climate engineering appears to be appealing,57
notably when facing potentially high costs of climate change mitigation through emission58
abatement and the political stall in climate policy negotiations. In particular, given the general59
uncertainties about the expected temperature change and the magnitude of impacts in the60
future, it has been argued that climate engineering can provide a valuable option for a situation61
where climate change turns out to be extremely costly. Apart from the scientiﬁc and economic62
uncertainties, ethical considerations, and moral issues regarding the manipulation of the63
climate, issues in international law regarding unilateral actions related to climate engineering64
create a strong barrier towards proceeding in research within this ﬁeld.3 It is therefore safe65
to say that if it were to be considered an option, it would take decades before a great deal of66
the surrounding uncertainties could be resolved (Robock et al. 2012).67
Notwithstanding the challenge of modeling climate engineering, the literature examining68
it has been growing exponentially in recent years (Mercer et al. 2011). Economists have69
contributed to the debate regarding the risks and virtues of climate engineering, unsurprisingly70
ﬁnding mixed results (see Klepper and Rickels 2012 or Barrett 2008 for an overview). On71
the one hand, climate engineering can provide a viable strategy and might be the lesser of72
two evils, in particular if climate change is very harmful in the future (Bickel and Agrawal73
2011). On the other hand, it comes with high uncertainty, potentially high costs in terms74
of potential damages, and an unknown effectiveness in the long run. Therefore, with our75
current knowledge, it may turn out to be costly to give up on emissions reductions and76
rely on climate engineering in the future (see e.g., the applications of Nordhaus’ DICE77
model in Gramstad and Tjøtta 2010 or Goes et al. 2011). The fundamental driver of the78
divergence of opinions in this polarizing debate resides in the assumptions about relative79
costs, damages, and the uncertainty about these parameters (Sterck 2011). However, very few80
papers have provided an explicit modeling of the uncertainty of climate engineering, with the81
exception ofMoreno-Cruz andKeith (2012). Their paper is similar to ours as they consider the82
dynamic decision problem using a simpliﬁed model and a numerical implementation based83
on DICE with convex abatement and linear SRM cost functions. Their numerical results84
suggest that the lower the side effects of climate engineering and the higher its effectiveness,85
the lower the abatement effort required in the ﬁrst stage. Moreover, climate engineering is86
more likely to be used if the climate sensitivity turns out to be higher. This illustrates its87
potential “insurance” effect. Their results, however, are mainly numerical and based on a88
simple integrated assessment model. Furthermore, they do not investigate the impact of the89
correlation between general climate and climate engineering uncertainties.90
Our paper aims at advancing this literature by focusing explicitly on the uncertain fea-91
tures of climate engineering andmost importantly how it would affect climate change policies92
today. Based on an analytical model similar to the one proposed by Lange and Treich (2008),93
we study the role of the uncertainties surrounding climate engineering and climate change94
as a whole to see whether it could or should be used in the future, under which conditions,95
and most importantly how it would affect climate change policies today. We analyze how96
much of the near-term optimal abatement should be carried out for different subjective suc-97
cess probabilities of a large-scale climate engineering program in the future and for different98
correlation structures with the uncertainty about the magnitude of climate change. Our paper99
uses a standard model of dynamic decision theory under uncertainty to analyze the interplay100
between climate engineering and abatement from an economic cost-minimizing perspective.101
3 The cancellation of the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) project in 2012
provides an example of the difﬁculties that research faces in this ﬁeld due to public opinion or the governance
of such projects (Pidgeon et al. 2013).
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We introduce a two-period model of abatement and climate engineering, where the latter is102
only available in the second stage since it is not available as a strategy as of today or the103
near future. We characterize the uncertainty about both climate engineering as well as the104
climate, and derive an analytical solution for the optimal policy under a global temperature105
target, that is, in a cost effectiveness (CEA) (and a CBA)4 framework. Under fairly general106
conditions we show that although today’s abatement effort is decreasing in the success prob-107
ability of climate engineering, abatement remains strictly positive and the relation with the108
probability of success of SRM is strictly concave. As a result, it is optimal to signiﬁcantly109
forego current abatement only under very optimistic assumptions regarding the feasibility of110
climate engineering. We also investigate the potential insurance effect of climate engineer-111
ing by modeling the relationship between the uncertainty of both the climate sensitivity and112
climate engineering, and are able to conﬁrm the results for reasonable correlation structures113
between both sources of uncertainty.114
In order to quantify the effects of the analytical model, we use a stochastic version of115
a large-scale integrated assessment model with a rich description of the abatement options,116
integrating the possibility of climate engineering as an alternative policy option to abatement,117
which becomes available in the future with a certain probability. The numerical ﬁndings118
conﬁrm the theoretical results: we ﬁnd that the optimal path does not deviate too much from119
the standard optimal abatement path as long as the probability of climate engineering is not120
close to one. The results are found to be robust to different timings of uncertainty resolution,121
different climate stabilization targets, and different degrees of correlation of the climate and122
climate engineering variables. From a policy perspective, our results suggest that uncertainty123
provides a strong argument for abatement as opposed to a “wait and see” policy relying on124
potential climate engineering options in the future, but it does not rule out the possibility of125
deploying climate engineering technologies in the future.126
This paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the general model considering127
the uncertain effectiveness of climate engineering in a framework with a given climate stabi-128
lization target. In Sect. 3, we allow for simultaneous uncertainty of both climate change and129
climate engineering. Using the an integrated assessment model, we provide a quantitative130
assessment of climate engineering in Sect. 4. Section5 concludes.131
2 Uncertain Effectiveness of Climate Engineering132
We begin by sketching out a simple analytical framework which captures the interplay133
between climate engineering and abatement under uncertainty in sufﬁciently general terms.134
Our model can be thought of as an extension of the uncertainty framework in Lange and135
Treich (2008) where we add a second uncertain, but possibly very cheap mitigation tech-136
nology. We model climate engineering as an uncertain process: as of today we do not know137
how effective it will be in substituting abatement to control global warming. While abate-138
ment measures can already be implemented, the limited evidence on the risks and impacts139
of climate engineering are such that a considerate amount of time will be needed to establish140
the scientiﬁc basis to implement climate engineering at a large scale. The question we try to141
answer in this section is how this uncertainty affects our decision today to mitigate climate142
change. Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2012) have highlighted the uncertainty and its importance143
for the optimal decisions regarding the implementation of climate engineering. They argue144
4 We applied a similar model in a cost beneﬁt analysis (CBA) framework. Overall, the results are qualitatively
very similar. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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Climate Engineering and Abatement: A ‘ﬂat’ Relationship…
that even if climate engineering is not potentially effective in offsetting global warming145
caused by CO2 emissions, it might considerably shape climate change policies due to the146
implied quick response of the global temperature.147
We use a simple model to analyze this question aiming to derive some general conclu-148
sions which economic theory can provide as guidance in this polarizing debate. Empirical149
calibration and speciﬁc assumptions will ultimately determine the best guess estimates of the150
potential crowding out between the two competing climate strategies, and we tackle this with151
the numerical integrated assessment model. The aim of this section is to test whether using152
general functional forms can tell us something about the trade-off between climate engineer-153
ing and abatement under uncertainty. This is a novel contribution to the literature. We use a154
simple two-period model where At denotes the level of abatement in period t = 1, 2, and G155
the level of climate engineering, which will be implemented only in the second period since156
it is not available as a large-scale alternative today.157
To model the effect on the climate, we use a simple energy balance model, in which the158
change in the globalmean temperatureT is approximated by a linear function of cumulative159
emissions as shown by Matthews et al. (2009).5 The ﬁnal temperature increase can then be160
written as a linear function of Sbau− A1− A2, where Sbau denotes the business-as-usual CO2161
emissions and At the abatement in period t . In order to simplify notation, wemeasure climate162
engineering G also in terms of its potential to reduce global mean temperature through the163
radiative forcing and we take into account that its effectiveness is not perfect and moreover164
uncertain. Its effect on effective temperature change can be expressed by the random variable165
ϕ˜ which can take on the values of 1 (with probability p) or 0 (with probability 1 − p).6166
Overall, the increase of global mean temperature can then be written as:167
T = λ(Sbau − A1 − A2 − ϕ˜G) (1)168
where the factor λ denotes the carbon-climate response that takes into account the propor-169
tionality of temperature and radiative forcing as well as the equilibrium climate sensitivity.7170
Since the latter is far more uncertain and debated, we will refer to it simply as the climate171
sensitivity in the following.172
The cost functionCA(A) is the standard cost function of abatement andCG(G) for climate173
engineering and both A andG are non-negative. It is worth mentioning that we do not include174
potential damages from climate engineering.Whilewe do not impose any functional form,we175
need tomake some assumptions about the relative costs of abatement and climate engineering.176
Since we express all variables in their potential to limit the increase of forcing generated by177
the CO2 stock in the atmosphere, we assume that abatement is in general more costly per178
unit. In particular, we impose that if climate engineering is effective, or that if ϕ˜ = 1, then179
it will be the only policy employed in the second stage. Formally, this can be ensured by180
assuming that marginal costs of climate engineering are never higher than the initial marginal181
abatement costs.182
5 While the relationship between carbon concentration and temperature is concave, the authors ﬁnd a linear
response of temperature to cumulative emissions in trillion tons of carbon emitted of 1.0–2.1 ◦C/TtC.
6 A way to interpret this binary random variable is on the one hand the effectiveness of SRM to tackle global
warming, but could also be the social acceptability or political feasibility to implement such a strategy.
7 In this simple relation we abstract from a non-linear forcing potential from climate engineering (Lenton
and Vaughan 2009) and moreover the decay of the atmospheric carbon. While the former feature would limit
the potential of climate engineering and thus strengthen our main result, the latter effect is included in the
numerical application even though its role is minor, see Matthews et al. (2009).
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Assumption 1
C ′G(x) ≤ C
′
A(0) ∀x183
This assumption in combination with our binary variable for the availability of climate engi-184
neering is sufﬁcient to ensure that in the last period only one policy alternative will be used.185
This is motivated by the literature which portrays climate engineering as a climate strategy186
with ‘incredible economics’ (Barrett 2008). Based on estimates of abatement policies com-187
pared with cost estimates of climate engineering implementation such as McClellan et al.188
(2012), this assumption seems reasonable.189
Throughout the paper,we deliberately take an optimistic view regarding the costs, potential190
side-effects, and overall potential of climate engineering vis à vis with abatement. This rather191
optimistic characterization of climate engineering allows us to explore a ‘limiting’ case that192
provides an important benchmarkwhich is further extended in the numerical analysis outlined193
in the paper. This case can be thought of an upper bound of the role of SRM options in the194
climate policy portfolio. Most of the results we ﬁnd here would only be strengthened by195
assuming a more pessimistic view. In reality, the risks and potential side-effects associated196
with climate engineering as well as the public opposition and the difﬁcult governance process197
are likely to limit its potential to meet only a fraction of the climate solution space.198
Assumption1 ensures that if climate engineering turns out to be themost effective (ϕ˜ = 1),199
it will be adopted as the only policy. However, if ϕ˜ = 0, it will not be used at all. The200
effectiveness of climate engineering will be learned before the decision is made during the201
second period.While during implementation, learning about its effectiveness is plausible, our202
interpretation of availability is more about the political feasibility based on the assessment203
of effectiveness and potential side effects.204
To determine the optimal climate policy, we consider the case of a climate stabilization205
policy, that is, we specify a ceiling in terms of maximum temperature increase over the pre-206
industrial level, Tmax , which can be directly converted into a goal in terms of maximum207
radiative forcing for a given value of climate sensitivity.8 The Social Planner then minimizes208
the cost of attaining this stabilization goal of the induced change inworld average temperature.209
The cost functions of mitigation and climate engineering are assumed to be increasing and210
convex. The total cost of achieving the target can be written as V (A1, A2,G) = CA(A1)+211
β (CA(A2)+ CG(G)) where β denotes the discount factor and hence the problem of a risk-212
neutral social planner can be stated as follows:213
min
A1,A2,G
E [CA(A1)+ β (CA(A2)+ CG(G))] s.t. λ(Sbau − A1 − A2 − ϕ˜G) ≤ Tmax214
(2)215
In the following, we derive a general condition for the curvature of the optimal ﬁrst-216
period decision variable A1(p) with respect to the probability p, which in our case captures217
the degree of uncertainty or subjective probability of the climate engineering option. Note218
that the result can however also be applied to other contexts of multiple policy instruments219
in a dynamic context under uncertainty. Regarding the total expected cost of attaining the220
stabilization goal, it is clear from (2) that an increase in the success probability of climate221
engineering reduces the expected costs. In this sense, climate engineering can be seen as222
an alternative option in the portfolio of actions against climate change, which has a strictly223
positive effect on the total expected policy costs in this stylized model.224
8 See also Lemoine and Rudik (2014) who discuss the reasons for specifying temperature targets for climate
policy.
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Given that either abatement or climate engineering is chosen in the second period, we can225











and the second order condition as228











where Sgap = Sbau−Tmax/λ represents the forcing reduction needed in the second period230
to meet the temperature target.231
By totally differentiating the ﬁrst order condition and using the second order condition232
we immediately ﬁnd that the optimal level of abatement in the ﬁrst period decreases in the233
success probability p of climate engineering or that A∗′1 (p) < 0 if Assumption1 holds.9 That234
is to say a more likely effective climate engineering program does reduce abatement today.235
This result is not surprising given the assumed substitutability between both policies, and236
conﬁrms the results of Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2012). However, for the sake of this paper,237
it is more important to explore how effective climate engineering would need to be to reduce238
today’s abatement efforts considerably. To this end, we need to understand the curvature of239
the function A∗1(p) and therefore we impose the following assumption discussed below:240
Assumption 2 The marginal total cost increase by increasing today’s abatement above opti-241
mal h(A1) ≡ C ′A(A1) − β[pC
′
G(S
gap − A1) + (1 − p)C ′A(S
gap − A1)] is convex or less242
concave than the difference between abatement and climate engineering costs in the second243




g′(x) ∀x ≥ 0.244
The cost gap between climate engineering and abatement in the second period g(A1)245
continuously decreases in ﬁrst-period abatement if Assumption1 holds, since the amount246
of abatement or SRM is reduced. Moreover, it is concave given that the cost function of247
abatement is steeper than that of climate engineering, (C ′G(x) ≤ C
′
A(x)). The function248
h(A1) on the other hand continuously increases due to the second-order condition; it is also249
very likely to be more concave than g(A1) based on the fact that the ﬁrst-order condition is250
given by h(A∗1) = 0.251
Thus, for all speciﬁcations that we applied numerically (quadratic and several power252
speciﬁcations), Assumption2 is always satisﬁed. While a characterization based only on the253
primitives of the problem would be preferred, this condition can thus be considered rather254
weak and is satisﬁed by standard cost functions applied in this context.10 We are now able255
to state our ﬁrst main result.256
Proposition 1 Under the assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal abatement in the ﬁrst period257
decreases and is concave in the probability that climate engineering is effective, i.e., A∗′1 (p) <258
0 and A∗′′1 (p) < 0.259







D . The numerator is negative due to Assumption1 while the261
9 Note that this would hold even in the case in which both climate engineering and abatement are used in the
second period.
10 Note that a sufﬁcient condition for the Assumption 1 to hold is a unambiguous ordering of the higher order
derivatives between climate engineering and abatement up to order three (C ′′G (x) ≤ C ′′A(x) and C ′′′G (x) ≤
C ′′′A (x) ) and moreover that C ′′′′A ≤ 0.
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second-order condition implies that the denominator is positive, hence A∗′1 (p) < 0. For the262
second part, we differentiate d A
∗
1










































and hence the ﬁrst and second additive terms in the267
numerator of the last expression are exactly the same, we get that268






























Now based on Assumption1, the ﬁrst term is negative and thus we have that271



















Noting that inAssumption2, h′(A1) ≡ D(A1) and g(A1) is the difference between abatement274







1 (p) to be negative ⊓⊔276
While the condition inAssumption2might seem difﬁcult to interpret, there is an economic277
meaning to it. Roughly speaking, the derivative of the value function with respect to the278
ﬁrst-period decision, i.e., initial abatement, needs to be convex or at least not too concave279
compared to the difference between abatement and climate engineering costs in the last280
period. In other words, marginal costs need to increase sufﬁciently fast in today’s abatement.281
Given the extremely differing cost estimates for abatement and climate engineering, this282
seems to be a justiﬁable assumption. Considering some frequently used speciﬁcations, we283
ﬁnd that condition 2 holds for the most widely discussed parameters.284
First, let us consider quadratic cost functions (or equivalently, damage functions if climate285
engineering damages and CO2 concentrations are included) as it is typically the case in286
numerical models. In this case, having a higher marginal cost at any level of abatement287
compared to climate engineering is sufﬁcient to ensure that A∗1(p)will be concave.Thismeans288
that abatement will be reduced slower than linearly and optimal ﬁrst-period abatement only289
slowly decreases. Similarly, a linear (as in Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2012)) or even quadratic290
cost function of climate engineeri g togetherwith quadratic or cubic abatement cost functions291
(with C ′′′A (A) ≥ 0) all meet the assumption and thus provide sufﬁcient conditions for initial292
abatement to be concave in the effectiveness probability of the climate engineering option. A293
linear climate engineering cost function, which is an exponent of the abatement cost function294
between two and three (implying C ′′′A (A) ≥ 0 ≥ C ′′′′A (A)) also satisﬁes Proposition1.This295
case covers widely used abatement cost functions such as the one used in RICE with an296
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exponent of 2.8 or estimates for EU countries in Eyckmans and Cornillie (2000) with an297
exponent between 2.1 and 2.9. In multi-model ensembles, which have used a large suite of298
integrated assessment models (Clarke et al. 2009; Kriegler et al. 2013), marginal abatement299
costs (asmeasured by carbon prices) have been shown to be convexwith respect to cumulative300
emission reductions, which are linearly related to radiative forcing, see also Matthews et al.301
(2009).302
These results suggest that for a fairly general speciﬁcation of the costs of achieving303
a stabilization goal of global warming, the assumptions of the outlined model hold and304
that short-term abatement is decreasing but strictly concave in the probability of success305
of climate engineering. Since optimal abatement is zero only for p = 1, this implies a306
rather gradual (i.e., less than linear) decrease in abatement as the probability of successful307
climate engineering increases. The intuition for this result comes from the fact that abatement308
costs are relatively high and convex, moreover climate engineering is only available in the309
future, and this option might fail to work in the future altogether. That is, climate engineering310
does provide an alternative to abatement in the model, but the uncertainty of its effectiveness311
makes abatement today respond slowly to an increase of the the success probability of climate312
engineering, suggesting a rather ‘ﬂat relation’ between the two climate control strategies.313
3 Uncertain Climate Engineering and Climate314
Since uncertainties are pervasive in the climate system itself, it seems reasonable to take315
into account much of this uncertainty and to see how the results with respect to climate316
engineering might change. Indeed, the strongest argument in favor of climate engineering is317
that it might provide a hedge against climate change, should this turn out to be more severe318
than expected. In this section we tackle this issue and model uncertainty also around key319
parameters of climate change or its impacts. In particular. the climate sensitivity has been320
found to be highly uncertain in this context, see e.g., Millner et al. (2013). The decision321
problem becomes now deciding on optimal abatement today and abatement and climate322
engineering in the future after learning the state of the world. Conceptually, this framework323
could be related to the theory of endogenous risks (Kane and Shogren 2000) where the324
distribution of climate change damages is affected by different actions of the decision maker.325
However, the dynamics of the present problem together with the joint decision on abatement326
and climate engineering renders this problemmuch more complex. We therefore concentrate327
our attention on a fully quadratic model; although restrictive, this still allows us to capture328
the fundamental trade-offs in the decision problem we are examining.329








V2(A1, A2,G, ϕ˜, x˜)
]
(5)332
where the objective function in the second period represents the cost of achieving the333
speciﬁed stabilization target in period two. We now consider two sources of uncertainty, the334
effectiveness of climate engineering (ϕ˜) and the magnitude of damages or the stringency of335
the stabilization goal (˜x). Without loss of generality, we restrict the random variables, namely336
that 0 ≤ ϕ˜ ≤ 1 and moreover assume that, in expectation, x˜ equals one so we can easily337
compare the results to the certainty case. As before, uncertainty is fully resolved before period338
two so that the decision made during the second period is deterministic. Moreover, we now339
use a a continuous distribution for ϕ˜ due to the additional uncertainty on the climate. Note340
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that this implies that even under Assumption 1, we now can have simultaneous abatement341
and climate engineering implementations in the future, since the effect on radiative forcing342
is potentially different.343
Due to the stabilization target, now in the second period climate engineering and abatement344
must be such that that the stabilization target in terms of the allowed temperature change is345
met. This target is now considered to be uncertain: if the climate sensitivity turns out to be346
high due to positive feedbacks in the climate system, then more forcing reduction is needed347
to achieve the same temperature objective. Since we expressed all variables in their radiative348
forcing potential, we know that the forcing reduction of the climate policies (achieved via349
both climate engineering and abatement) must be greater or equal to Sbau− Tmax
x˜λ
where the350
climate sensitivity x˜λ is now uncertain. The term Tmax
x˜λ
can be interpreted as the cumulative351
emissions (taking into account climate engineering as effective negative emissions) that are352
allowed in order to meet the temperature stabilization targetTmax . The climate sensitivity353
is now a parameter unknown ex ante and equal to x˜λ. Higher values of x˜ correspond thus to354
states with a higher climate sensitivity implying a more stringent effective emission target.355
The social planner’s decision program in the second period case can be written as:356
min
A2,G
CA(A2)+ CG(G) s.t. x˜λ(Sbau − A1 − A2 − ϕ˜G) ≤ Tmax (6)357
We specify the cost functions to be quadratic with marginal abatement costs cA and358
marginal costs of climate engineering cG . The quadratic cost assumptions allow us to keep359
our optimistic assumption about the costs and potential impacts from climate engineering.360
Moreover, since this assumption excludes effects from prudence or the third derivatives of361
cost functions, it does not give rise to a precautionary savings motive in abatement due to362
the timing of the model. We solve the model backwards starting in the second period. Given363
that the climate sensitivity x˜λ and hence the effective emission target Sbau − Tmax
x˜λ
and the364
effectiveness of climate engineering are learned before making the decisions on abatement365
and climate engineering, we know that marginal costs are equalized between them. Solving366











The ﬁrst term can thus be interpreted as the share of abatement of total climate policy369
in the second period. Based on the optimal second period’s decisions, this allows us to use370
an envelope theorem argument to simplify the ﬁrst-period decision based on (5). We obtain371
the optimal ﬁrst-period abatement level expressed as the share of total abatement without372














Note that due to the quadratic cost speciﬁcationwithout ﬁxed costs, the solutionwill always375
be interior.11 From this condition it can be seen that the quadratic speciﬁcation implies among376
others that rather than assuming the uncertain effectiveness of climate engineering, we can377





11 Note that in general we don’t restrict the level of abatement, even though one could consider the case where,
in particular for a high value of the climate sensitivity, traditional abatement measures can be not sufﬁcient to
meet a given climate target, see also Neubersch et al. (2014).
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this model.12 The share of abatement of the total climate policy in the second period denoted379
as(ϕ˜)and decreases in the effectiveness of climate engineering. It is also easy to show that380
it is convex in ϕ˜ if the lower bound of the domain of ϕ˜ and the relation between abatement381






This condition states that the share of climate engineering in the climate policy during384
the second period is concave in ϕ˜ provided that abatement is more expensive. This can be385
expected to hold in our context. For instance, if we assume a lower bound of the effectiveness386
ϕ˜ of 0.1, and take the estimate ofMcClellan et al. (2012)who suggest that climate engineering387
costs are only around one per cent of the equivalent CO2 abatement costs, this condition is388
easily met. Basically, this condition states that climate engineering must be cost-effective389
enough in order to dominate abatement in the future, which seems reasonable. Based on the390
analytical formula of ﬁrst-period abatement and the curvature of (ϕ˜) we can derive the391
following results for the quadratic model speciﬁcation under consideration:392
Proposition 2 If (˜x, ϕ˜) are independent, an increase in risk in the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz393
in ϕ˜ increases A∗1 if condition (8) holds, while an increase in risk in x˜ leads to a decrease394
of A∗1. If (˜x, ϕ˜) are not independent and the distribution F (˜x, ϕ˜) undergoes a marginal395
preserving increase in concordance,13 optimal ﬁrst-period abatement A∗1 decreases.396
Proof The ﬁrst part for independence follows since the numerator of (7) simpliﬁes in this397





. Since the term in the expectation is convex in x˜ and subtracted398
from Sbau , the Jensen inequality immediately implies that an increase in risk in x˜ leads399
to a lower level of A∗1.14 Considering the denominator of (7), and due to the convexity of400
(ϕ˜) ensured by the condition in (8), by its deﬁnition, an increase in risk in ϕ˜ leads to an401
increase of E(ϕ˜) and hence to a higher level of A∗1. For the second part, ﬁrst note that402
the denominator of (7) is not affected by the marginal preserving increase in concordance.403
However, an increase in concordance implies that Cov((ϕ˜), 1
x˜
) decreases (see Epstein and404
Tanny 1980 or Egozcue et al. 2009) since (ϕ˜) is monotonically decreasing. Rewriting the405






thus shows that initial abatement406
decreases since the univariate expectations are unchanged. ⊓⊔407
More uncertainty about climate engineering implies a higher level of initial abatement408
since the probability of having to rely on expensive abatement also in the future is higher. A409
higher degree of uncertainty about the climate sensitivity on the other hand lowers optimal410
abatement in the ﬁrst period. Intuitively, it affects the target in both cases with and without411
climate engineering, and the possibility of a lower target reduces to ﬁrst-period abatement412
12 The reason that ϕ˜ enters as a squared term here as well as in Eq. (7) can be explained by the fact that an
increased effectiveness of climate engineering has both a marginal and inframarginal effect. It lowers marginal
costs of climate engineering compared to abatement but at the same time increases the effectiveness of the
SRM already applied thus lowering the needed amount to reach the same result in terms of radiative forcing.
13 Concordance describes the degree of association between two random variables in a more generalized way
than correlation.
14 This effect is due to the fact that the target in terms of emission reduction depends on the reciprocal of the
climate sensitivity. Since E [˜x] = 1, the convexity around this point is comparably small as the hyperbola in
this region can be approximated by a linear function and thus the effect of uncertainty of x˜ alone is expected
to be rather low.
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to avoid potentially unnecessary, “irreversible” abatement costs. In this model, due to the413
quadratic speciﬁcation, no precautionary motive arises, which explains this effect besides414
the lock-in effect of initial abatement.415
If the effectiveness of climate engineering and the uncertain stabilization target are not416
independent, this introduces another effect depending on the sign of the correlation. It affects417
the numerator of (7) which can be understood as the perceived stringency of the stabilization418
target froman ex-ante perspective. To separate both effects,weuse the concept of concordance419
as in Tchen (1980). The (linear) correlation between x˜ and ϕ˜ is not sufﬁcient due to the non-420
linear reaction in the second period. Therefore, we need a stronger criterion of relatedness.421







becomes less stringent than if it were known with certainty (Tmax
λ
) if (˜x, ϕ˜) become less423
concordant. That is, we obtain an “insurance” effect of climate engineering: initial abatement424
can be lower if climate engineering is more likely to be effective when x˜ is high. Note that425
this “insurance” effect might be counteracted by the direct interaction between effectiveness426
of climate engineering and the climate sensitivity, see also Ricke et al. (2012).427
But how strong are these effects? In order to assess the relative magnitude, we turn to428
a simple calibration of the model. In particular, we specify the climate engineering effec-429
tiveness as a binary Bernoulli random variable: ϕ˜ ∼ {1 : p; 0 : (1− p)}. The potential of430
climate engineering is thus either zero or as effective as abatement in order to reduce global431
temperature. We assume, as argued in McClellan et al. (2012), that the cost of climate engi-432
neering is around one per cent of abatement , i.e., cA/cG = 100, and use a discount factor433
for a ﬁfty-year time span (the ﬁrst period in our model) based on a yearly one percent dis-434
count rate. Finally, we assume a degree of uncertainty about the climate sensitivity typically435
found in the literature (Meinshausen et al. 2009)in that we consider a uniform distribution436
x˜ ∼ U [0.5, 1.5] resulting in a range of 2–4.5 ◦C which is considered most likely according437
to the IPCC fourth assessment report.438
Figure1 shows the optimal ﬁrst-period abatement relative to the total abatement level439
without the climate engineering option (denoted CE) for varying probabilities of climate440
engineering becoming a viable climate policy option. Considering uncertainty as speciﬁed441
and assuming that both randomvariables are independent, the curve is concave in p–as shown442
in the previous section—and initial abatement A∗1 is substantially higher than under certainty443
(dashed line), showing a rather “ﬂat” behavior in the value of p.15444
Let us now consider different degrees of the relatedness between the effectiveness of445
climate engineering and the climate sensitivity. To date, little is known about the correlation446
between how possible climate engineering strategies work and the fundamental parameters447
of climate change, in particular, the reaction of the climate to greenhouse gas emissions.448
Matthews andCaldeira (2007) argue that a priori there is no reason to assume any relationship449
between both parameters. On the other hand, the potential difﬁculty of climate engineering450
to compensate for the regional differences of climate change might give rise to a negative451
correlation (Ricke et al. 2012).Moreover, if aerosols aremore effective at cooling the climate,452
the historically observed warming and thus estimates for the climate sensitivity could have453
been too low, which would imply a positive correlation.16454
To quantify how the correlation between climate engineering effectiveness and climate455
sensitivity would affect our results, we use a copula approach to model the joint distribution456
15 As stated in Proposition2, the situation where only the climate sensitivity is uncertain (depicted in light
blue) implies a lower level of initial abatement. However, as argued before, this effect is much smaller than
the effect of uncertain climate engineering.
16 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this interesting point to us.
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Fig. 1 Share of ﬁrst-period abatement of total abatement without climate engineering for different values
of p
F (˜x, ϕ˜) to capture different degrees of relatedness. In particular,we consider the Frank copula457
to capture the relationship between x˜ and ϕ˜. It is appropriate to model a positive as well as458
a negative relationship, since it is symmetric, and allows including very extreme degrees459
of relatedness, see, e.g., Trivedi and Zimmer (2006). This approach allows the quantitative460
impact on the optimal abatement policy to be assessed. In Fig. 1, we also show the optimal461
ﬁrst-period abatement for the extreme positive and negative correlation admissible. We take462
rather extreme values for the parametrization of the copula such that for p = 0.5 it implies a463
rank correlation between x˜ and ϕ˜ of−0.8,zero, and+0.8. As xpected, a negative correlation464
case reinforces the results shown so far, with a pronounced concavity of A∗1 in p. On the other465
hand, in the case of extremely high positive correlation the proﬁle of A∗1(p) becomes almost466
linear. In this case, climate engineering has a strong insurance character and therefore the least467
abatement is optimal. But even in this case of positive hedging of climate engineering against468
severe climate outcomes, ﬁrst-period abatement remains substantially higher compared to469
the certainty case for all chances that climate engineering is effective.17470
4 Numerical Results with an Integrated Assessment Model471
In this section we use the integrated assessment model (IAM) WITCH (Bosetti et al. 2009)472
to perform a numerical exercise to (a) see whether the theoretical results carry over to a much473
more detailed model and (b) assess the quantitative magnitude of the effect of uncertain474
climate engineering on the optimal abatement path and a series of key variables of climate475
mitigation effort. The integration of the climate engineering strategy into a numerical IAM476
has been carried out in some recent papers using DICE, a simpliﬁed, one region model477
Bickel and Agrawal (2011); Goes et al. (2011); Gramstad and Tjøtta (2010). In this section478
we introduce climate engineering and uncertainty in a fully ﬂedged integrated assessment479
model. First, we consider the case of only uncertainty about climate engineering and then we480
take into account also uncertainty about the climate sensitivity.481
17 In fact, if the rank correlation is positive, it might even be optimal to have zero abatement in the ﬁrst
period if the conditional expected value of climate sensitivity in the case where ϕ˜ = 0 is sufﬁciently low.
Nevertheless, in numerical examples we considered this turned out to be the case only for a very extreme
positive correlation structure, which are far beyond realistic values.
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WITCH has been used extensively in the literature of scenarios evaluating international482
climate policies. It is a regional (13 macro-regions), long-term dynamic model based on a483
Ramsey optimal growth economic engine, and a hard linked energy system which provides484
a compact but exhaustive representation of the main abatement options both in the energy485
and non-energy sectors. The choice variables are investments and activities in the overall486
economy, in the abatement technologies, and in the knowledge sector. The objective is to487
optimize welfare measured by the logarithm of consumption, discounted with a social rate of488
time preference declining from 3 to 2% per year over themodel time horizon (to 2150, with 5-489
year time steps). Technological change in both energy intensity and low-carbon technologies490
is endogenous and is modeled via both innovation and diffusion processes. Emissions from491
fossil fuels accumulate in the atmosphere leading to temperature increase which generates a492
negative feedback on the economy. The model has a game theoretical set up which allows493
portraying different degrees of cooperation among regions as well as to feature multiple494
externalities on both the environment and the innovationmarkets. For the sake of this analysis,495
we focus on the fully cooperative solution inwhich the joint regionalwelfare (measured as log496
of consumption) is maximized by the global social planner. The model is solved numerically497
in GAMS/CONOPT. A description of the main model equations can be found on the model498
website at www.witchmodel.org.499
For the purpose of this paper, two main model extensions have been carried out. The ﬁrst500
extension is using a stochastic version of the model. Stochasticity has been introduced in501
IAMs in several recent contributions, in the most cases using a version of DICE, see Keller502
et al. (2004), Lontzek et al. (2015), or Lemoine and Traeger (2016). In order to account503
for the uncertainty of climate engineering and the climate response, we use a stochastic504
programming version of WITCH (see Bosetti and Tavoni (2009) for a previous application).505
Model variables are redeﬁned on nodes belonging to a scenario tree with two branches;18 at506
a given point in the future, climate engineering can either succeed (with some probability p),507
or fail (with probability 1− p). In the case of the uncertainty on both climate engineering and508
climate, we use a four-branch scenario tree. Despite the simpliﬁed description of the state509
space, this reformulation of the model allows us to capture the implications of uncertainty510
on the abatement strategy before uncertainty is resolved, enabling us to devise an optimal511
hedging strategy.19 Given that utility is deﬁned as a logarithm of consumption, this implies512
a degree of relative risk aversion of one in the stochastic version of the model. While the513
theoretical analysis is based on risk neutrality, higher values of risk aversion have been514
suggested in the literature. However, when we allowed for different degrees of risk aversion,515
the results remained almost unchanged, a fact in line with the ﬁndings of, e.g., Ackerman516
et al. (2013).517
The second model extension regards the development and inclusion of a climate engineer-518
ing module. We model climate engineering as an option to reduce solar radiation through519
stratospheric aerosols. Speciﬁcally, we model million tons of sulfur (teragrams or TgS)520
injected into the stratosphere at the global scale to lead—if successful—to a negative radia-521
tive forcing of−1.75 W
m2TgS , which is a best guess estimate as in Gramstad and Tjøtta (2010),522
based on a range from −0.5 (Crutzen 2006) to −2.5 (Rasch et al. 2008a). We also assume a523
stratospheric residence time of two years, which is in the range of a few years (Rasch et al.524
18 Instead of accounting explicitly for the non-anticipative constraints, non anticipativity is implicitly deﬁned
through the characterization of predecessor/successor relationships among nodes in the scenario tree.
19 The stochastic programming formulation of WITCH increases computational time substantially, by 3-4
times for a two branch scenario tree, and by 20 for a four branch scenario tree. The four branch scenario tree
cooperative solution (for which we cannot take advantage of parallel computing) takes 180 hours to solve on
a 2.6 GHz Intel Xeon processor.
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2008b). Finally, we assume a linear cost function at a cost of 10 billion $/TgS within the525
range considered in the literature, between 5 (Crutzen 2006) and 25 billion (Robock et al.526
2009) USD per TgS. In line with the objectives of this paper, this speciﬁcation of climate527
engineering is an optimistic one, in particular since we abstract from side-effects and dam-528
ages associated with the deployment of climate engineering; when running a cost beneﬁt529
analysis, we also assume that damages are only a function of temperature but are not linked530
to the CO2 concentration, thus abstracting for the damages related to ocean acidiﬁcation.531
These two effects could be integrated in our framework since increasing the costs of climate532
engineering and reducing the costs of abatement respectively would increase the optimal533
ﬁrst-period abatement level, further strengthening our results.534
We run scenarios to mimic the theoretical approach outlined before. In particular, we535
implement the stabilization policy by imposing a target20 to be met by 2100 in terms of536
“very likely” maintaining the temperature increase below 2 ◦C, which we implement through537
a target based on a radiative forcing of 2.8W/m2. In this set up we do not consider the538
climate feedback on the economy, but rather prescribe the climate stabilization policy. The539
social planner maximizes global welfare deﬁned as expected discounted utility based on a540
logarithmic utility function.541
Figure2 shows the main results with a probability p = 0.5 of climate engineering becom-542
ing available in the year 2050. For comparability, we also report a scenario without the543
climate engineering module (green dotted line) as well as the no climate business as usual544
(BAU) policy (black dash-dotted line). In the state of the world in which it is effective (red545
line), climate engineering turns out to be a perfect substitute for abatement; consequently,546
post 2050 abatement becomes zero and the the forcing target is achieved entirely via climate547
engineering, which is implemented just before 2100, given the assumptions that it is fast,548
costs are linear, and the forcing target can be overshot. These results are expected given the549
optimistic assumptions regarding the effectiveness and costs of climate engineering. In the550
case were CE is no effective (blue dotted line), emissions have to be reduced even below the551
case without CE due to the reduced mitigation prior to 2050. Now for the short and medium552
term policy implications, it is interesting to understand to what extent the climate strategy553
changes with respect to the certainty case before the uncertainty about climate engineering554
is resolved. Figure2 indicates quite clearly that before 2050, the differences are rather small.555
The optimal abatement path in the WITCH optimization under uncertainty is only slightly556
below the one without the climate engineering option. In both cases, signiﬁcant abatement557
is carried out, both by energy efﬁciency measures as well as by deploying abatement tech-558
nologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), renewable energy, nuclear power and559
low-carbon fuels. The marginal social cost of carbon in 2010 is 28.9 $/tCO2 and 19.4 $/tCO2560
for the cases without climate engineering, with a 50% chance that climate engineering is561
effective respectively. Thus, as in the case of the analytical model, hedging against the risk562
that climate engineering is not effective provides a strong rationale for carrying out abatement563
prior to uncertainty being resolved. The hedging is signiﬁcant since it has to allow avoiding to564
lock in fossil fuel capital which is long lived. It would also preclude the eventual attainment565
of the climate stabilization target, even when accounting for abatement technologies, which566
allow sequestering CO2 from the atmosphere.21567
20 The target is an ‘overshoot’ one, i.e., the 2100 target level can be exceeded prior to 2100. It refers to the
aggregate radiative forcing from Kyoto gases, Non-Kyoto gases, and aerosols. Direct forcing from nitrate
aerosols, mineral dust and land surface albedo changes are not included in the list.
21 This version of the WITCH model features as carbon dioxide removal options biomass burning and CCS,
which allows negative emission and which plays a major role in the results of the integrated assessment
modelsTavoni and Tol (2010).
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Fig. 2 Climate and emission trajectories (p = 0.5)
So far, we have considered that the probability of climate engineering becoming a viable568
option is p = 0.5. If we allow this probability to vary, we are able to replicate the exercise of569
the previous sections. To this end, we have run the WITCH model with ten different values570
of p (from 0 to 1) and have determined the actual shape of abatement before the resolution of571
uncertainty in 2050 for increasing the success probabilities of climate engineering. Figure3572
shows this relationship for the climate stabilization target and alternatively a cost-beneﬁt573
approach based on a damage function (analytical and numerical results are available upon574
request from the authors).575
The results of Fig. 3 clearly conﬁrm the theoretical ﬁndings of our analytical model. The576
relation between optimal abatement prior to the resolution of uncertainty and the success577
probability of climate engineering appears to be concave and moreover quite “ﬂat” when we578
increase p. Moreover, the decrease of early abatement in p is slower in the CEA case of a579
stabilization target while it becomes closer to linearity in the CBA case.22 With respect to the580
magnitude, the level of abatement declines to almost zero only if the probability is very high:581
at an 80% success probability of climate engineering, optimal abatement is approximately582
60% of what would be carried out in the absence of climate engineering. This result is583
particularly strong compared to the certainty case: if it is known that ϕ = p, no abatement584
would be implemented for any value of ϕ not too close to zero23, since in this case climate585
engineering will be the only climate policy used in the future given its cost advantage. As586
outlined earlier, this shows that due to the dynamic decision problem, uncertainty induces a587
very signiﬁcant wedge in the optimal abatement strategy in the early periods, and provides588
a strong argument for maintaining abatement policies even when taking a very optimistic589
viewpoint on the potential of climate engineering. Given the non linear relation between590
22 We performed a similar analysis using a CBA approach with a damage function rather than a ﬁxed climate
target. These results are available upon request from the authors.
23 In our model simulations, no abatement was the optimal strategy for values of ϕ as small as 10−4.
123



















Climate Engineering and Abatement: A ‘ﬂat’ Relationship…
0 0.5 1









































































Fig. 3 The share of pre-2050 abatement and the marginal cost of carbon
abatement and marginal costs, the marginal abatement cost—shown in the right panel of591
Fig. 3—is more sensitive to the probability of success of climate engineering.592
As in Sect. 3, we now introduce uncertainty about not only the effectiveness of climate593
engineering, but also climate change itself. In particular, we consider a binary distribution for594
the value of the equilibrium climate sensitivity (CS) which is calibrated at 3.2 in the standard595
version of WITCH. We assume that it can either take on a value of 2.7 or 3.7 with equal596
probability. Although this approach can be considered as rather conservative compared to597
estimates of the distribution of climate sensitivity (e.g, Murphy et al. (2004)), it still captures598
the generally considered range of its values. We consider again a policy aiming at limiting599
the temperature increase to at most 2.5 ◦C by the end of the century. Given that now both600
climate engineering and climate are uncertain, we use a four-branch stochastic tree structure601
in WITCH. We assess the cases when different random variables are both uncorrelated and602
correlated.24 In particular, we consider two rather extreme correlation structures where the603
probability of climate engineering becoming a viable option is 0.9 in case of a high (low)604
climate sensitivity and 0.1 in case the CS is low (high). This results in a bivariate distribution605
with unchanged marginal distributions but a correlation coefﬁcient of ρ = +0.8(−0.8),606
which can be considered a very extreme correlation structure. In particular, a very high607
correlation could rationalized if the probability of climate engineering were to be interpreted608
as its public acceptability, which could be higher if climate change impacts are more severe.609
Table1 summarizes the abatement effort prior to the resolution of uncertainty in all scenarios610
compared to the abatement over the whole century in the certainty case without climate611
engineering. That is, the values can be interpreted as how strong the short—to medium term612
optimal abatement levels are across scenarios.613
24 In order to capture the effect of different climate sensitivity values, we have to deﬁne the stabilization target
now in terms of temperature increase. We have chosen a value in line with previous runs.
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Table 1 Abatement relative to
total abatement in the 21st
century in the certainty case
without climate engineering for
different correlation structures
Scenario SRM Abatement 2005–2050 (%)
ρ = 0 yes 16.2
ρ = +0.8 yes 10.4
ρ = −0.8 yes 19.1
certainty no 17.1
uncertain CS no 20.3









































































Fig. 4 Emission and energy related variables 2005–2045, for different correlation structures between CS and
SRM
The table shows that climate sensitivity uncertainty alone leads to higher initial abatement614
(20.3 vs. 17.1%). With the most unfavorable correlation structure in which climate engineer-615
ing is likely to be effective when CS is low (ρ = −0.8), the abatement level is only slightly616
reduced to 19.1%. In the uncorrelated and positive correlation cases, initial abatement is617
lowered to around 16 and ˙10% of total 21st century abatement, respectively. Even with a618
very optimistic correlation structure in which climate engineering is most effective when619
the climate warms mostly and thus has a strong insurance characteristic, roughly half of the620
abatement remains socially optimal .621
Figure4 provides an additional comparison of the scenarios with different correlation622
structures, by providing a series of key indicators of transformation of the energy system.25623
The chart shows that the extent of the transformation of the energy system towards an efﬁcient624
and lowcarbon one is indeed negatively driven by the correlation between climate engineering625
effectiveness and climate sensitivity: in particular when the correlation is positive (green solid626
line), there is signiﬁcant less effort to promote energy efﬁciency, reduce carbon intensity, and627
invest in energy saving research and development.However, all the scenarios entail signiﬁcant628
efforts to promote a more efﬁcient and clean energy system. Moreover, if the correlation is629
25 Primary energy is measured in exajoules, energy intensity in MJ per US-$, carbon intensity in kgC/MJ and
investment in bln. US-$.
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negative (red dash-dotted line), energy and carbon intensity improvements are even higher630
than under certainty without CE (black dashed line).631
Overall, the WITCH numerical results provide further support of the thesis presented in632
the preceding sections: evenwhen considering the insurance value of climate engineering, the633
traditional strategy to mitigate emissions by restructuring the energy sector is only partially634
crowded out and remains the most important climate policy option in the short and medium635
term.636
5 Conclusion637
This paper has assessed the interplay between climate engineering and abatement in the638
presence of uncertainty. We have deliberately taken an optimistic view regarding the costs639
and effectiveness of climate engineering, and have studied to what extent the uncertainty640
about climate engineering provides a rationale for undertaking more or less abatement. To641
address this question, we have used a rather general analytical economic model as well as a642
numerical integrated assessment model and have explored the optimal economic decisions643
both in a cost effectiveness framework.644
Our results consistently show that considering the possibility of climate engineering645
through solar radiation management as a comparably cheap and effective alternative to tradi-646
tional abatement climate policies has an impact on optimal climate change policies. However,647
we demonstrate that even when disregarding potential side effects and secondary costs, the648
uncertainty surrounding the large scale implementability of climate engineering26 gives rise649
to a strong case of traditional abatement as an optimal near-term climate policy. In particular,650
our paper shows that the response of abatement to the success probability of climate engi-651
neering is nonlinear and strictly concave, thus implying a rather constant or “ﬂat” reaction652
of abatement to the introduction of climate engineering. Previous studies such as Bickel and653
Agrawal (2011), Gramstad and Tjøtta (2010), Goes et al. (2011), and Sterck (2011) do not654
take into account this dynamic decision problem but rather rely on Monte Carlo exercises655
which do not capture the dynamic learning and decision making process. We also show656
that our results hold true to a signiﬁcant degree even when we allow for different relations657
between the uncertainty about climate engineering and the climate, as a way to assess the658
insurance value of climate engineering. Our results are also conﬁrmed by means of extensive659
robustness analysis on several key parameters.660
Further research is a prerequisite to assess whether there will be a viable climate engineer-661
ing option at some point in the future and how or whether it could alleviate global warming662
(MacMartin et al. 2014). Our results however suggest that, for the time being, climate engi-663
neering does not warrant to be taken as a reason to signiﬁcantly delay the abatement effort664
from an economic point of view, even under optimistic scenarios related to its feasibility and665
acceptability. These results are derived disregarding any ethical or governance issues which666
have been shown to raise further con erns regarding the potential of climate engineering.667
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